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Abstract 
 
 
 
Trademark dilution is a highly controversial cause of action that has been the 
subject of hundreds of law review articles, but no significant scientific work.  We 
analyze 60 years of telephone white pages, corporate & LLC naming data, 
advertisements from the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington 
Post, state and federal trademark databases, and all recorded dilution litigation.  
Our data suggest strongly that famous trademarks are frequently borrowed for use 
as trade names in services, but almost never as trade marks on products. Given 
that Congress based anti-dilution legislation on the assumption that uses like 
“Buick Aspirin” were common, our conclusions are significant. Our data also 
show that state federal anti-dilution laws likely have had some effect in the 
significant decline in brand sharing that we chart.  We conclude by examining the 
still-widespread phenomenon of brand sharing and find that recent psychological 
studies help explain way the harm allegedly caused by unauthorized sharing 
(denominated “dilution” by Congress) is unlikely ever to occur.  
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THE MYTH OF BUICK ASPIRIN:  AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF TRADEMARK  
DILUTION BY PRODUCT AND TRADE NAMES  
 
“[T]he potency of a trademark may be debilitated by another’s use.  This is the essence of 
dilution.  Confusion leads to immediate injury, while dilution is an infection, which if allowed to 
spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising value of the mark.”1
 
 
Paul J. Heald * 
 Robert Brauneis ** 
 
 
 Like the mythical Hippogriff,2 the specter of BUICK ASPIRIN haunts the pages of the 
Congressional Record3 and the imagination of hundreds of trademark law commentators.4  
Why?  Because the hypothetical headache remedy succinctly captures the essence of a 
controversial trademark cause of action which requires no likelihood of confusion on the part of 
consumers exposed to the mark.  If we saw BUICK ASPIRIN on a drugstore shelf, we might be 
intrigued or annoyed, but we would be unlikely to think that General Motors had just opened a 
new pharmaceutical division.  Nonetheless, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 
(FTDA)5 provides a remedy to the auto manufacturer for an “association arising from the 
similarity between a mark or a trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of 
                                                 
*Associate Dean for Faculty Development & Allen Post Professor of Law, University of Georgia. 
. 
**Professor of Law, George Washington University School of Law; Co-Director of the George 
Washington University Law School Intellectual Property Law Program. 
 
1 See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1955, H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1996), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030 (citing Mortellito v. Nina of California, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) [hereinafter H.R. REP.]). 
2 A hippogriff is the product of the union of a griffin and a mare.  See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Hippogriff for more information of this creature. 
3 H.R. Rep., supra note 1, at 2-3 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1029 (offering Schlitz 
Varnish, Buick Aspirin, Dupont Shoes, and Kodak Pianos as examples of unauthorized uses of famous 
trademarks that would lead to the harm identified as “dilution”). 
4 A search of “Buick Aspirin” in the Westlaw JLR database retrieves 202 documents.  WESTLAW, 
www.westlaw.com (last visited Dec. 16, 2009). 
5 See supra note 1. 
 3
the famous mark.”6  The legislative history of the law offers up BUICK ASPIRIN, DUPONT 
SHOES, SCHLITZ VARNISH, and KODAK PIANOS as examples of unauthorized uses that 
Congress thought would definitely dilute the distinctiveness of those famous marks.7
Until 1996, federal legislation did not ban the unauthorized use of a famous trademark 
unless a likelihood of consumer confusion could be shown.8  Before the passage of the FTDA of 
1995, an unscrupulous aspirin manufacturer could theoretically have taken a free ride on Buick’s 
good name.  The fear of unauthorized uses of famous marks proved too much for federal 
legislators who saw the need to provide a new sort of protection for “the substantial investment 
the owner has made in the mark and the commercial value and aura of the mark itself, protection 
from those who would appropriate the mark for their own gain.”9  A cause of action, based not 
on the likelihood of consumer confusion, but rather on the potential for an unauthorized use to 
“dilute” the value of a famous trademark, was finally recognized on the federal level.  Therefore, 
after 1995, sharing in a brand name’s luster without the authorization of the trademark owner 
should have been deterred. 
 In order to measure the deterrent effect of the FTDA and of anti-dilution statutes enacted 
in several states in the 1950s and 1960s, we conducted a study of trade name usage in telephone 
business white pages.  In a separate paper we chart a 54% decline in the shared usage of 131 
marks that held a significant degree of fame from 1960-2010.10  We analyze a number of 
                                                 
6 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2006). 
7 See supra note 3 for the location of these marks in the legislative history. 
8 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, §4, 109 Stat. 985 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§1127 (2000), superseded in part by Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, §2, 
120 Stat. 1730 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §1125(c) (2006)). 
9 See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1955, H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1996), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030. 
10 See Robert Brauneis & Paul J. Heald, Trademark Infringement, Trademark Dilution, and the Decline in 
the Sharing of Famous Brand Names:  An Introduction and Empirical Study, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1662623. 
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variables that might have contributed to the decline and conclude that increased legal protection 
for trademarks during that fifty-year period partially explains the downward trend.11  Other 
factors, however, including economic changes in the urban areas studied, changes in surname 
usage and family migration, trends in name personalization, and the decreased attractiveness of 
some famous marks over time also may have played a role.  Although the exact proportion of the 
decline caused by legal factors is unclear, our prior study marks the first serious attempt to count 
the number of concurrent multiple users of the same well-known trademark in the same 
geographic location.  We were successful in mapping for the first time a very important, and 
hitherto undocumented, phenomenon.  
 The present study also charts trends in unauthorized sharing,12 but with changes in 
methodology, data sources, and normative conclusions.  Our first study focused on data collected 
from business name entries in the white pages of Chicago, New York City, and Philadelphia.  
We identified unauthorized uses of 131 trademarks, most of which were identified as brand 
leaders in a 1923 market survey and maintained their fame and market position until at least the 
late 1980s.  We found thousands of instances of unauthorized sharing of identical marks and 
noted a substantial decline in that sharing from 1960-2010.  We now broaden our search to 
include trademark uses in state corporate name and LLC databases in six states (three that passed 
anti-dilution statutes well before 1996 and three that had no anti-dilution statutes before 1996).  
We also performed global searches in the Westlaw state trademark registration database and the 
federal trademark register, and we searched advertisements in the New York Times, Washington 
                                                 
11 See id. at 25-30. 
12 In our previous study, we used the term “independent uses” to describe those uses that were not 
authorized by the famous user of a brand name, because we did not want to suggest that authorization was 
required, or even that the independent user necessarily knew of or was motivated by the famous use.  In 
this article, we use the more familiar term “unauthorized uses,” but we intend it to have the same meaning 
as our term “independent uses.” See infra note 40 and accompanying text for further information on 
determining “unauthorized uses.” 
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Post, and Wall Street Journal.  We also investigated all recorded dilution litigation under state 
and federal anti-dilution statutes from 1946 onwards. 
 In addition to analyzing different data sources, we narrowed the number of trademarks 
under scrutiny from 131 to thirty-three.  The present paper focuses specifically on the potential 
effect of anti-dilution legislation that protects only famous and distinctive marks, while our first 
study included many marks like BAKER’S, METROPOLITAN, EAGLE, DIAMOND, and 
ROYAL.  These marks are almost certainly not eligible for protection under dilution statutes due 
to the commonness of the names and concomitantly large number of third-party users.13  In this 
study, as explained below, we concentrate on the 33 of the 131 marks most likely to qualify for 
protection under the FTDA.  Thus, in this study we did not just look for unauthorized uses; we 
looked for unauthorized uses that were potentially dilutive as a matter of law.  The change in 
data sources and marks studied allowed us to confirm trends found in our earlier study, to 
introduce data from rural localities (as opposed to only three large metro areas), and to measure 
the frequency of name sharing on commercial products as opposed to business names (something 
we could not do earlier because our study of telephone white pages by its nature could only catch 
trade names or service marks).  We propose to address three important new questions:  1)  Was 
there ever a time when trademark dilution was potentially a problem?  2)  Does the federal 
dilution statute deter potentially diluting uses?  3)  Is the unauthorized sharing we document 
likely to cause economic harm? 
 In Part I, we provide some background on dilution doctrine and explain our methodology, 
focusing on the choice of the 33 marks to study.  In Part II, we report our findings on the 
prevalence of unauthorized uses of the 33 famous trademarks in the data sources mentioned 
                                                 
13 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(iii) (2006) (noting that one  important dilution factor is “the extent to 
which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in substantially exclusive use of the mark”). 
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above.  We conclude that before 1996 the overall number of unauthorized uses of famous marks 
as trade names (business names) of mostly local, small enterprises was more than de minimis, 
and was quite substantial in the cases of CADILLAC and HARVARD.  Critically, however, as 
far as product names are concerned, we find no evidence that unauthorized uses were ever a 
problem.  In other words, proponents of anti-dilution legislation would do well to abandon 
BUICK ASPIRIN as their poster child for abuse.  The absence of significant unauthorized uses 
of famous marks on products leads us to conclude that dilution was never likely a problem.  
After all, sporadic, purely local uses as trade names are unlikely to significantly affect the 
distinctiveness of a famous national mark.14
In Part III, we examine the effect of federal anti-dilution legislation on rates of 
unauthorized use of the 33 famous marks.  We suggest that the 1996 FDTA may have deterred 
some uses, but we also attempt to correlate the downward trend we find with changes in a mark’s 
prominence over time.  We consider whether a decline in unauthorized uses may be due to 
diminished brand luster which would make a mark less attractive to appropriate.  We conclude in 
Part IV by taking a snapshot of the present market for famous marks, including marks like 
MCDONALD’S and FORD, that were omitted from our historical analysis.  The vast number of 
unauthorized uses of some of the most iconic American trademarks suggests that consumers 
have a well-developed ability to cabin information in ways that maintain the associational values 
of even the most over-used marks.  We look at the literature on consumer cognition and suggest 
                                                 
14 See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005:  Hearing on H.R. 683 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109 Cong. (2005) (statement of 
Anne Gundelfinger, President of the International Trademark Association) (“[W]here other similar marks 
are already wide use and have been over a lengthy period of time, it may be less likely that the junior use 
will have the effect of blurring the famous mark, unless those uses have little or no visibility to the 
average consumer.”).  We do not assert, however, that Congress did not intend to create a cause of action 
against sporadic local uses.  We simply doubt that our finding of three or four unauthorized uses of Oreo, 
Rolex, or Rolls Royce before the federal dilution statute actually harmed those marks. 
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that sharing in the absence of confusion seems unlikely to cause the economic harm to trademark 
owners feared by Congress. 
I.  DILUTION DOCTRINE AND DATE COLLECTION METHODOLOGY  
  
The somewhat tortured history of dilution doctrine sheds light on our motivation for 
conducting the study and on the methodology we chose. 
  
A.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF DILUTION STATUTES 
  
The first influential suggestion that trademarks merited protection from unauthorized uses 
even in the absence of consumer confusion was offered by Frank Schechter in 1927.15  He 
hypothesized that unauthorized uses of famous marks would result in “the gradual whittling 
away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark by its use upon 
non-competing goods.”16  The primary justification for protection, therefore, is based on 
empirical assumptions about the effect of unauthorized uses on human cognition.  As the leading 
treatise on dilution elaborates, “the second user . . . weakens the bond between the consumer and 
the brand,” adding that “[o]ne might reasonably describe diluting uses of a mark as ‘source 
distractors’ . . . distract[ing] the viewer from the primary source-identifying content of the 
mark.”17  Importantly, neither state legislatures enacting dilution statutes, nor the federal 
Congress, had before them any empirical evidence to support these cognitive assumptions 
                                                 
15 See generally Frank Schechter, The Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 
(1927) (analyzing “historical preconceptions as to the nature and function of a trademark and as to the 
necessities for its protection”). 
16 Id. at 825. 
17 See David S. Welkowitz, TRADEMARK DILUTION:  FEDERAL, STATE, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 
(2002) (discussing dilution laws). 
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underlying dilution theory.  And not surprisingly, dilution legislation has consistently 
encountered significant judicial resistance.18  And at the federal level, it took fifty years of 
lobbying to finally convince Congress to pass a dilution statute over objections from those 
fearing the benefits of protection would not outweigh potential monopoly costs19 and 
encroachment on free speech values.20
 In fact, according to Clarisa Long, “[e]ver since the creation of federal dilution law, legal 
commentators have expressed consternation about this variant of the trademark entitlement.”21  
In essence, experts have always doubted whether a hypothetical BUICK ASPIRIN would, in 
fact, have negative economic consequences for General Motors.  Our initial doubts went even 
deeper than doubting the potential for harm.  We questioned whether famous marks were really 
an attractive target for appropriation in the first instance.  After all, choosing BUICK as a new 
trademark for aspirin seems like a questionable business decision, equally as likely to alienate 
consumers as to attract them.  The combination of word and product seems bizarre and 
unattractive.  We could never remember seeing a product on the marketplace shelf that 
resembled the examples suggested in the legislative history of the FTDA, and we speculated that 
self-interested businesses might decide without legal persuasion to avoid diluting uses of famous 
                                                 
18 See Joshua G. Jones, The ‘Iniquities’ of Dilution:  How the Judiciary May Use Principles of Equity to 
Frustrate the Intent of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 200, 
201 (2009) (“Few developments in the law have been as resistant to judicial acceptance as trademark 
dilution.”); Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1032 (2006) (suggesting judicial resistance 
to dilution as a reason for the declining success of dilution claims); 3 RUDOLF CALLMAN, THE LAW OF 
UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPOLIES § 84.2, at 960 (3d ed. 1969) ( “Perhaps some of 
the resistance to the doctrine of dilution is attributable to judicial unwillingness to recognize a trademark 
as property.” ); 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
24.15 at 24-126 -126.1 (3d ed. 1995) (noting that “state dilution statutes have met with a considerable 
amount of judicial skepticism and resistance,” and there has been a “generalized judicial reluctance to 
believe that state dilution statutes are really to be read literally.”). 
19 See Welkowitz, supra note 17, at 155. 
20 Id. at 157. 
21 See Long, supra note 18, at 1029.  
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trademarks.  The legislative history contains not a single example of an actual historical instance 
of a diluting use.   
The collective doubts of the judiciary and commentators about dilution led us to consider 
a means for testing three controversial hypotheses:  1)  Unauthorized uses of famous marks were 
never a widespread historical phenomenon; 2)  Resistance to dilution protection renders it 
ineffective in reducing unauthorized uses;  3)  To the extent that brand sharing occurs, it is 
unlikely to cause harm to the shared brand name, because assumptions about human cognition 
implicit in dilution doctrine are baseless.  The vociferous debates over the desirability of dilution 
legislation have been conducted in the absence of empirical evidence.  We aimed to fill that void 
by examining the market behavior of a sample of famous trademarks. 
 
B.  METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
 The initial goal of this study was to measure unauthorized uses of a sample of famous 
trademarks during the time periods before and after the passage of state and federal anti-dilution 
legislation.  Unfortunately, many of the state corporate and LLC databases were incomplete for 
entities that dissolved prior to dates in the late 1970s or early 1980s, so the data we collected on 
entity names prior to those times was unreliable.  As a practical matter, we can only report 
corporate name and LLC data from the time period shortly before the 1996 FTDA and cannot 
opine about the effect of state dilution statutes passed in the 1950s and 1960s.  We had planned 
to extend the study back to 1940 (when our white pages study began), and we still explain our 
trademark choices below in light of that original goal, because other data, such as that gleaned 
from the trademark registries and newspapers we study, is reliable at least back to 1925. 
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The first goal was to identify trademarks that were famous for substantial periods before 
the passage of the first state dilution statutes22 and then to track unauthorized uses of those marks 
over time.  Luckily, in 1923, two New York University professors conducted a study “of 100 
representative commodities showing the names and brands that are most familiar to the 
public.”23  Hotchkiss and Franken surveyed over 1000 college students, provided them with a list 
of 100 product types, and asked them to list the most prominent brands they associated with each 
category.24  Their responses provide an essential snapshot of which trademarks were most 
dominant in their brand markets in the 1920s, two full decades before the Massachusetts passed 
the first anti-dilution statute in 1947 and seventy years before the passage of the federal law in 
1995.  We selected a sample of these marks to track from 1925 to the present. 
 Our sample of marks, however, was not entirely randomly selected for several reasons.  
First, we wanted to make sure that the marks studied retained their brand leadership over time.  
Very few marks have been consistently famous since 1925, and we wanted to know the extent to 
which unauthorized uses occurred before the advent of anti-dilution statutes and whether rates of 
unauthorized usage changed in response to legislation.  To make sure we had some consistently 
famous trademarks, we worked with two studies following up on Hotchkiss and Franken’s 1923 
brands that identified which of those marks had retained their prominence in the market place to 
modern times.25  Among these marks that retained their fame, we excluded marks that almost 
                                                 
22 Massachusetts passed the first statute in 1946 and other major jurisdictions, including New York, 
Illinois, and California, had statutes in place by the mid-1950s. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 110B, § 
12 (1996); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 368-d (1996); 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 1035/15 (1996); and Cal. Bus. 
& Prof. Code § 14330 (1996). 
23 See generally GEORGE B. HOTCHKISS & RICHARD B. FRANKEN, THE LEADERSHIP OF ADVERTISED 
BRANDS (1923) (providing study). 
24 Id. at 8-21. 
25 Peter N. Golder, Historical Method in Marketing Research with New Evidence on Long-Term Market 
Share Stability, 37 J. MARKETING RES. 156 (2000) (studying the longevity of all Hotchkiss’s famous 
brands);  Peter N. Golder, Study:  Majority of 25 Leaders in 1923 Still on Top—‘Old Standbys Hold Their 
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certainly do not benefit from the protection of dilution statutes,26 that is to say famous marks that 
are also common surnames, like Baker, Campbell, Ford, Singer, and Welch; or common 
descriptive words like Ivory, Royal, Metropolitan, Gold Medal, and Carnation; or common 
place-names like Manhattan.  Such marks can undoubtedly be famous and valuable, but dilution 
statutes are not much help to owners who are not “engaging in substantially exclusive use of the 
mark.”27  If a word has always been used by many parties to identify a wide variety of different 
types of goods, then dilution legislation does not change the legal landscape relevant to that 
mark.28
 Excluding trademarks consisting of common surnames, common descriptive words, or 
common place-names left us with a list of famous marks most likely to benefit from anti-dilution 
laws, such as COCA-COLA, HARLEY DAVIDSON, KODAK, PALMOLIVE, and SHERWIN-
WILLIAMS.  We also consulted a well-known review of internationally famous trademarks by 
Interbrand, World’s Greatest Brands29, which rates the strength of hundreds of diverse brands.  
This review lists several older U.S. brands whose prominence extended from the 1920s or 1930s.  
Where we could confirm longevity of their fame in the Encyclopedia of Consumer Brands,30 we 
                                                                                                                                                             
Own, ADVERTISING AGE 32 (Sept. 19, 1983) (reporting that a narrow group of the most famous of 
Hotchkiss’s brands were still market leaders). 
26 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(iii) (2006) (noting that one factor in determining whether a mark has 
been diluted is the “extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in substantially exclusive 
use of the mark”). 
27 Id. 
28 A quick look at on-line yellow pages and the Hoovers business database reveal hundreds of unrelated 
businesses safely operating under each of the above names.  See YP, http://www.yellowpages.com/ (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2011) (providing yellow pages database); HOOVERS, 
http://www.hoovers.com/companies/100003475-1.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2011) (providing access to 
the Hoovers database).  For example, the yellow pages in just California and New York list approximately 
1000 businesses using the trade name Campbell that have no apparent connection to Campbell’s soup, 
with Hoover’s listing over 400 unrelated Campbell entities.  There are many thousands of Manhattan and 
Ford trade names in use that are unconnected to shirt making or automobiles.  There are over 1000 uses of 
Singer in the Hoover database unrelated to sewing machines, and so on . . . 
29 INTERBRAND, WORLD’S GREATEST BRANDS, AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW (1992). 
30 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSUMER BRANDS (Janice Jorgenson ed.) (1994). 
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added the Interbrand trademarks to our list, including such marks as BACARDI, CHANEL, 
IBM, MERCEDES-BENZ, ROLEX, TAMPAX, and ZIPPO.  Concerned that our list lacked 
enough of the sort of luxury brand names most likely to be the object of unauthorized use, we 
consulted another source, Icons of the American Marketplace,31 to see if we could identify any 
long-lived brands that might have attracted more unauthorized users than EX-LAX or 
TAMPAX.  Once again, after checking brand histories, we were able to add CADILLAC, 
HARVARD, and STEINWAY, one of which (Steinway), was also listed in Hotchkiss and 
Franken’s 1923 study.  Finally, we included the three iconic brands found in the Congressional 
Record32 and used ubiquitously in examples by commentators:  BUICK, BULOVA, and 
SCHLITZ.33
 The list of 33 famous marks that we chose to track is listed in Figure 1 below.34  The 
goal was not to create a comprehensive inventory of the most famous marks of the twentieth 
century, nor to identify every mark that had ever held brand leadership for a prolonged period of 
time.  Our objectives were more modest, namely, to arrive at a sample of famous marks  1) all of 
which were famous before the enactment of anti-dilution statutes, 2) all of which almost 
certainly qualified for anti-dilution protection because of their relative uniqueness, e.g. not 
common adjectives, surnames or place names, and 3) some of which were luxury marks, the 
most attractive to free riders. 
                                                 
31 AMERICAN BENCHMARK PRESS, ICONS OF THE AMERICAN MARKETPLACE:  CONSUMER BRAND 
EXCELLENCE (2007) (listing the most valuable and famous brands in the United States). 
32 See H.R. Rep., supra note 1, at 2-3 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1029 (offering 
Schlitz Varnish, Buick Aspirin, Dupont Shoes, and Kodak Pianos as examples). 
33 See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 24:105 (“For example, the most popular list of offending examples 
against which antidilution laws are directed is: Dupont shoes, Buick aspirin, Schlitz Varnish, Kodak 
pianos and Bulova gowns.”). 
34 The fame of the three of the marks does not extend from the 1920s, but rather from the 1950s:  
Corvette, Rolex, and Perrier.  In states that enacted anti-dilution statutes in the 1950s or before, we can 
draw no conclusions about the affect of legislation on rates of unauthorized use. 
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    Figure 1 
BACARDI   BUDWEISER   BUICK 
BULOVA   CADILLAC   CHANEL 
CLOROX   COCA-COLA   CORVETTE 
DR. PEPPER   EX-LAX   GREEN GIANT 
GUINESS   HARLEY-DAVIDSON HARVARD 
IBM    JACK DANIELS  JELL-O 
KODAK   LOUISVILLE SLUGGER MERCEDES-BENZ 
OREO    PALMOLIVE   PERRIER 
ROLEX   SANKA   SCHLITZ 
SHERWIN-WILLIAMS STEINWAY   ROLLS-ROYCE 
TAMPAX   WINDEX   ZIPPO 
 
 
We tracked all 33 marks in the corporate/LLC name databases in California, Illinois, 
Michigan, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin.35  Due to the limitations mentioned above, we 
tracked marks in California from 1977-2010, in Illinois from 1987-2010, in Michigan from 
1977-2010, in New York from 1982-2010, in Ohio from 1960-2010, and in Wisconsin from 
1977-2010.  Given their size, commercial importance, and geographical diversity, California, 
Illinois, and New York were obvious choices for study.  All three states, however, passed state 
anti-dilution statutes in the 1950s, which may have blunted the effect of the 1996 federal 
legislation in those jurisdictions.  Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin, which never passed anti-
dilution legislation, were therefore added as the three largest commercial jurisdictions where 
                                                 
35 See Business Search, CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE DEBRA BOWEN, http://kepler.sos.ca.gov/ (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2011) (providing California corporate and LLC filings); CyberDriveIllinois, JESSE WHITE, 
SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.ilsos.gov/corporatellc/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2011) (providing Illinois 
corporate and LLC filings); Corporate Division Business Entity Search, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH, http://www.dleg.state.mi.us/bcs_corp/sr_corp.asp (last visited Jan. 30, 2011) 
(providing Michigan coporate and LLC filings); Division of Corporations, State Records and Uniform 
Commercial Code, NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://www.dos.state.ny.us/corps/ (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2010) (providing New York corporate and LLC filings); Business Filings, JOHN HUSTED, 
OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/businessServices.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 
2011) (providing Ohio corporate and LLC filings); and Search Corporate Records, STATE OF WISCONSIN 
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, https://www.wdfi.org/apps/CorpSearch/Search.aspx? (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2011) (providing Wisconsin coporate and LLC filings). 
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reliable filing data was available.  The relevant data point chosen for study was the recorded 
filing date of the new entity name by the corporate or LLC agent.  Because there are so many 
different reasons why a corporation or limited partnership might be dissolved, we collected no 
data on the life span of any of the entities after the date they established their corporate or LLC 
status. 
 Like our earlier white pages data, evidence of corporate and LLC naming trends provide 
substantial evidence of trade name or service mark usage.  Nonetheless, data on product names, 
in addition to business names, is available from other sources we surveyed.  For example, some 
purveyors of products register their product names as trademarks under state trademark 
registration systems or in the federal trademark office, so we searched for all 33 marks in the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office registration database36 from 1905-2010 and in the Westlaw 
state trademark registration database which covers all active marks from 1900 and all inactive 
marks from 1986 for all 50 states.37  In addition, we searched for a smaller selection of 
conspicuous luxury marks38 in commercial advertisements in the New York Times, Washington 
Post, and the Wall Street Journal from 1925-2005.  Finally, we examined all reported cases 
where dilution (as opposed to a finding of likelihood of confusion) was the determinative factor 
in a litigated decision39 to measure how frequently unauthorized product names are litigated as 
                                                 
36 See Trademark Electronic Search System, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,  
http://tess2.uspto.gov/ (last visited January 31, 2011) (providing trademark search system). 
3737 The applicable Westlaw database is TRADEMARKSCAN - U.S. State (ST-TM).  Since not all states 
have digitized their records back to 1900, the database, in fact, cannot accurately claim to contain all 
marks from any particular date.  It would be more accurate for Westlaw to claim that it has all digitized 
records. 
38 We chose Rolls-Royce, Cadillac, Mercedes-Benz, Rolex, Steinway, Harvard, Chanel, Porsche, Disney, 
Corvette, and Tiffany, reasoning that these marks would be most attractive for appropriation. 
39 In this entire study, we are concerned with identifying whether the innovative cause of action for 
trademark dilution matters.  Cases in which the standard infringement cause of action based on a 
likelihood of consumer confusion provides a remedy are of little interest to us, even if dilution was 
pleaded as an alternative form of relief.  The relevant question is:  What does the dilution cause of action 
give to a trademark owner that he or she did not have under prior law? 
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opposed to unauthorized service marks.  Although these combined sources hardly provide a 
comprehensive picture of the life of product names in the U.S., they do provide a useful snapshot 
of product markets.   
 In searching all data sources, we proceeded generally under rules established in our first 
study for determining what constitutes an unauthorized use.40  The most important question, of 
course, was the determination whether the brand name was used with permission of the most 
famous trademark owner or not.  Determining whether a use was unauthorized was a judgment 
call backed up by research whenever possible.  For example, in 1935 in Illinois we found a 
BUDWEISER INN, BUDWEISER GRILL, and also a BUDWEISER LABORATORIES 
                                                 
40 We established six main principles in our first study.  Because names chosen for the present study are 
relatively uncommon, the following rules came into play with much less frequency: 
Broad definition.  Generally, any name that began with one of 131 brand names in the study and 
that was recognizably the name of a business was included.  Thus, names such as “Buick Joseph Inc.,”  
“Buick Manufacturing Co.,” “Buick Market,” and “Buick & Brown” would all be counted as uses of the 
brand name “Buick.”  We also included all instances in the singular, plural, and possessive: “Buick 
Market,” “Buick’s Market,” and Buicks Market” were all counted. 
No individual professional listings.  One type of listing features the full name of an individual, 
followed by the name of a profession or of goods or services in lower case letters, such as “Buick, Maria 
F. lawyer” or “Buick John G. metal prods.”  These listings were excluded from the study. 
Alternate spellings or variants.  In our first study, we did not attempt to track alternate spellings 
of brand names, such as “Douglass,” or “Forde.”  Because the 33 names chosen for this study were less 
common, we were able to include variations such as “I.B.M.” or “Rollex”, but we did not include 
variations that did not immediately recall the original mark, e.g. “Channel”. 
First word uses only.  In our first study, we only searched for brand names when they were listed 
as the first word of the company name in the telephone book.  Thus, for example, “Flowers by Buick,” 
“Brown & Buick,” and Joseph Buick & Sons” would not be included as uses of the brand name “Buick.”  
In this study, we did count some non-initial uses that seemed clearly to evoke the original brand, e.g. 
“Ernie’s Cadillac Lounge and Dance Club.” 
Geographical and Semantic Compounds Excluded.   We did not count the occurrence of one 
of the names in our study as a brand name use when it was immediately followed by another word and the 
two words together formed a local place name.  For example, Harvard is a common street name and 
Cadillac is the name of a large suburb of Detroit.  So, “Harvard Avenue Drugs” was not counted, nor was 
“Cadillac City Cleaners.”  Following an established rule of trademark law that “unitary marks” are to be 
considered as a whole, we decided that each of these two-word place names would be experienced as a 
whole, and we therefore did not count uses of them as uses of the brand names. 
Branches and departments not counted as separate uses.  Sometimes a single entity will 
incorporate each location of its business separately.  If “Rolex Realty,” for example, incorporated 
separately a branch in Milwaukee and one in Madison, we counted only one unauthorized use.  If the 
same entity incorporating “Rolex Realty,” however, branched out into a new business, e.g. “Rolex 
Travel,” then we counted two unauthorized uses. 
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INSECTICIDE.  To modern eyes, all of these may seem likely to be unauthorized (at the time 
unauthorized uses were legal in the absence of consumer confusion).  Further research revealed, 
however, that during prohibition, breweries like Anheuser-Busch and Schlitz diversified their 
brands into other related product markets, including restaurants.  It was therefore likely that the 
BUDWEISER INN and BUDWEISER GRILL were authorized uses.41  The insecticide 
laboratory, however, was counted as unauthorized.  It is highly unlikely that Anheuser-Busch 
would want to have tarnished its mark in a poisonous pesticide venture, a conclusion supported 
by arguments made by Anheuser-Busch in later unrelated litigation against a Florida insect 
exterminator that used a paraphrased a Budweiser slogan, “Where’s there’s life, there’s bugs” in 
its advertising.42  Identifying unauthorized uses was usually much easier: more typical were 
SANKA BIOTECH, INC. (California, 2005), ROLEX PAINTING CORP. (New York, 2007), 
and KODAK PLUMBING, INC. (Illinois, 1994).43
Finally, as a general rule, we did not count the use of a name on goods or services related 
to the famous mark as unauthorized.  We assumed as a factual matter that businesses like 
“Budweiser Beer Distributors” or “Bob Jones Cadillac” were authorized.  Trademark law has 
always provided a simple confusion-based remedy for the unauthorized use of a trademark on an 
identical or similar good or service, so consistent or related uses seemed most appropriately 
categorized as authorized.44
                                                 
41 If they were unauthorized, Anheuser-Busch could almost certainly have shut them down by suing under 
the standard likelihood of confusion cause of action. 
42 See Allied Chemical Corp. of Am. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433, 439 (5th Cir. 1952) (finding 
Budweiser slogan, “Where there’s life . . . there’s Bud” was infringed by pesticide company’s slogan, 
“Where there’s life . . . there’s bugs.”). 
43 Searches can be performed at web sites of each Secretary of State:  http://kepler.sos.ca.gov/, 
http://appext9.dos.state.ny.us/corp_public/corpsearch.entity_search_entry, and 
http://www.cyberdriveillinois.com/departments/business_services/corp.html. 
44 Anti-dilution statutes are not aimed at preventing the use of similar or identical trademarks on similar or 
identical goods.  This is not the behavior that the statutes were designed to sanction.  Where confusion is 
 17
   
II.  UNAUTHORIZED USES OF FAMOUS TRADEMARKS 
 
 We first report incidences of unauthorized uses of famous trademarks as trade names in 
records of state corporate and LLC name filings.  We then report evidence of unauthorized uses 
of famous trademarks as product names in national newspaper advertisements, trademark 
registration records, and in reported litigation. 
 
A.  FAMOUS TRADEMARKS AND UNAUTHORIZED USES IN TRADE NAMES 
 
 Our earlier telephone white pages study found 12,779 unauthorized uses of 131 famous 
brand names from 1940-2010.  Only a portion of those uses, however, were potentially diluting.  
Many of the marks studied were common words, like “royal,” “diamond,” or “metropolitan,” or 
common last names, like Campbell, Douglas, or Ford, unlikely to qualify for protection under 
dilution statutes which demand at least a substantial level of exclusivity.45  Considering the sub-
set of 33 brand names chosen for this study, we revisited our earlier white pages data and 
isolated for the first time 391 unauthorized uses of those 33 marks in Chicago, New York, and 
Philadelphia in 1940, 1960, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010.  The 33 brands accounted for about a 
quarter of the total number of trademarks studied, but only 3% of the uses determined to be 
unauthorized.  Uses which are potentially diluting seem to be only a small percentage the overall 
phenomenon of brand sharing, but it is difficult to conclude that 391 total appropriations in three 
                                                                                                                                                             
likely, the existence of an anti-dilution statute is unlikely to change one’s behavior, so it makes sense to 
ignore any entry that showed a use of a trademark consistent with or related to its famous use. 
45 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(iii) (2006) (permitting a court to consider “[t]he extent to which the 
owner of the famous mark is engaging in substantially exclusive use of the mark”). 
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cities over seventy years is de minimis, especially given only six years were surveyed.  We 
should note, however, that the data is heavily influenced by unauthorized uses of HARVARD 
and CADILLAC, which account for 238 of the 391 (60%) total. 
FIGURE 1 
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In the present study we expand the search for unauthorized, and therefore potentially 
diluting, uses of our 33 marks into state corporate and LLC name databases.  This enables us to 
evaluate the tentative conclusion, articulated for the first time above, that levels of potentially 
diluting uses were more than de minimis.  State corporate and LLC name data also lets us further 
examine the role of HARVARD and CADILLAC and observe whether the declining trend of 
unauthorized uses in telephone white pages is mirrored in another data source. 
 In California, from 1977 to 2010, we found 304 different corporations or LLCs that had 
adopted one of our 33 marks as their registered name without apparent authorization.  We found 
176 unauthorized name adoptions in Illinois from 1987-2010, while in Michigan (1977-2010), 
New York (1982-2010), Ohio (1960-2010), and Wisconsin (1977-2010) we found, 80, 483, 104, 
and 23 respectively.  So, over roughly a thirty-year time period, we found 1170 different 
corporations or LLCs that deliberately chose one of our 33 trademarks as its registered name.  
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Considering this total in conjunction with the white pages data, we conclude that the amount of 
deliberate sharing in famous brand names is greater than de minimis.  We should note, however, 
that not all the corporations and LLCs studied necessarily used their registered names as 
advertised trade names or as service marks.  Some corporations never refer to their official 
registered name in public, while others entities are stillborn and never even put their name on 
stationary or a web site.  We cannot report on the market impact or actual market presence of the 
business entities we study. 
 We also note the predominance of CADILLAC and HARVARD in the data.  Of 1170 
unauthorized adoptions reported above, 675 were registrations of corporate or LLC names that 
included the CADILLAC or HARVARD trademarks.  This is 58% of the total, very close to the 
60% role occupied by the same two marks in the white pages data reported above.  Among the 
thirty-one other marks, we found 495 unauthorized uses, which we still consider to be more than 
de minimis; nonetheless, the predominance of CADILLAC and HARVARD in the data is 
striking.  This could mean, perhaps, that CADILLAC and HARVARD should not be on the list, 
that their use is as non-exclusive as “diamond,” “metropolitan,” or “royal,” and that they do not 
merit protection from dilution statutes.  Although it is possible that CADILLAC and HARVARD 
have already been diluted, we do not conclude that our data proves it.  The extent of third party 
uses, and not just the number of those uses, matters in determining the dilution of a famous 
national mark.  We have shown a large number of third-party adoptions, but we have no data on 
visibility and impact on the public.  If third party uses are sufficiently obscure (e.g., Kodak 
Plumbing in Lockport, Illinois) or do not bring the famous brand owner to mind (e.g., Harvard 
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Drugs in Harvard, Illinois), then even a large number of unauthorized uses would not necessarily 
disqualify a famous mark from protection.46
 Further, in our earlier white pages study we noticed a significant decline in unauthorized 
uses of the full complement of 131 marks from 1960 to 2010.  The downward trend is also seen 
in the present corporate and LLC registration data once overall trends in the number of filings are 
considered.  We have data at five-year intervals since 1982.47  From 1982-86, we found 138 
unauthorized uses, from 1987-91 (148), from 1992-1996 (133), from 1997-2001 (168), from 
2002-2006 (176), and from 2006-2010 (164).48  Since 2006-2010 is a four-year period, we 
estimate a five-year total as 205 unauthorized uses (25% higher than the four-year total).  In 
terms of raw numbers, there is a gain from 138 to 205 (67% increase) from 1982 to 2010; 
however, there was a much more significant increase in the overall number of corporate and LLC 
filings during the same time period (mostly due to the advent and increasing popularity of the 
LLC form).  Just as we had to consider the changes in the size of our white pages data base over 
time in order to chart a true decline of uses in that data source, we must divide the raw number of 
unauthorized uses in the corporate/LLC data by the total number of filings in a given time period 
to obtain an accurate use rate in the corporate/LLC registration data. 
 Incomplete state records make it difficult to set forth a single number that encapsulates 
the trend in overall number of new corporate and LLC filings during the years studied, but we 
can summarize as follows.  From 1994-2007, overall filings in California increased steadily from 
55,278 to 200,787, a 363% increase.  In Illinois, from 1986 to 2008, overall filings increased 
                                                 
46 See supra note 14. 
47 This data excludes Illinois, where available information starts in 1987.  We will ignore Illinois until we 
compare percentage data. 
48 We lacked 2010 data for Ohio.  Since we found a total of 12 unauthorized uses in 2006, 2007, 2008, or 
4 per year, we estimated that 2010 would reveal approximately 4 more, so we counted Ohio as having 16 
unauthorized uses from 2006-2010. 
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steadily from 26,955 to 64,497, a 240% increase, and in Michigan from 1995-2008, 40,887 to 
67,828, a 65% increase.  In New York, from 1993-2009, filings increased from 80,454 to 
128,339 a 71% increase; in Ohio, from 1982-2009, 3565 to 75,545, a whopping 2100% increase; 
and in Wisconsin, from 1990-2009, 7254 to 3328, a 46% decrease.  Since we have data for every 
jurisdiction from 1995 to 2008, we can plot a steady upward trend in total filings during that time 
period for all six states combined: 
Year  Total Number of Filings
1995   218,952 
1996   235,747 
1997   252,794 
1998   267,574 
1999   290,523 
2000   335,643 
2001   324,187 
2002   366,795 
2003   396,959 
2004   439,882 
2005   471,452 
2006   480,013 
2007   490,660 
2008   461,080 
 
The increase in the period 1995-2008 of the total number of new corporate and LLC filings is 
from 218,952 to 461,080, an increase of more than 210%.  This dwarfs the increase in 
unauthorized uses we found during roughly the same period of 168 (1997-2001) to 205 (2006-
2011), which was a mere 22% increase. 
 Since the yearly trends are fairly steady in all states studied, we are very confident in 
concluding that the rate of unauthorized famous brand name choice per filing has steadily 
decreased during the time period of our study.  We depict the trend on a state-by-state basis 
below, using averaging to interpolate data for years in between the five-year intervals at which 
we collected data: 
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              FIGURE 3 
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Providing a combined rate with the data is trickier given the variations in earliest years of 
available data, but a blended curve can be provided. 
FIGURE 4 
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Again, one can perceive a significant downward trend,49 but one must be aware that the curve 
from 1987-1992 represents only Illinois and Ohio, with New York added in 1993, California in 
1994, and Michigan in 1995.    We consider in Part III below whether this trend is related to the 
passage of the FTDA in 1996. 
 
B.  FAMOUS TRADEMARKS AND UNAUTHORIZED USES ON GOODS 
  
Although our survey of business white pages and corporate name/LLC records showed 
evidence of numerous unauthorized uses of our 33 famous brand names as trade names or 
service marks, our survey of national newspaper advertisements, trademark registration records, 
and reported cases found unauthorized uses of famous trademarks as product names were very 
rare. 
  
1.  Newspaper Surveys.  In the absence of a historical database providing a 
comprehensive listing of product names used over time, we were forced to find other sources that 
might reveal unauthorized uses of famous marks.  Since products are frequently advertised in 
newspapers, we searched for databases that allowed targeted searching of display advertisements 
and that extended historically from the era before the passage of anti-dilution statutes.  The 
ProQuest database allows for a targeted searching of advertisements in the New York Times 
(NYT), Wall Street Journal (WSJ), and the Washington Post (WP) from the 1920s (and even 
                                                 
49 A regression of the form:  Rate = B0 + B1*(year-1996) + error was fit over the 13 time points from 
1996-2008.  In the case of 5 states combined the effect clearly significantly negative, with a P-value < 
.0001. 
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earlier) until 2006 (NYT), 1993 (WP), and 1992 (WSJ).50  Ideally, we would have included some 
west coast and Midwestern newspapers and some newspapers from smaller metropolitan areas, 
but it was not feasible to send our research assistants into hard copy archives to check every 
display ad in a newspaper, printed daily, for an eighty-year period.  Despite the limitations of 
only looking at three major east coast newspapers, we think that our findings nonetheless suggest 
a hesitancy on the part of unauthorized users to choose product names based on someone else’s 
famous mark, e.g. BUICK ASPIRIN. 
 A preliminary search of our list of famous marks in several years’ worth of 
advertisements proved tedious (there are many legitimate ads) and revealed no unauthorized 
uses.  Puzzled by the lack of hits, we decided to game the search deliberately in order to discover 
if there was some pattern of unauthorized uses that might suggest a better use for our limited 
resources.  So, we chose what we thought might be the most attractive brands from the list of 33 
(ROLLS-ROYCE, CADILLAC, MERCEDES, ROLEX, STEINWAY, HARVARD, CHANEL, 
CORVETTE), and after adding three additional attractive marks (PORSCHE, DISNEY, 
TIFFANY), we searched a full year’s worth of ads in 1925, 1930, 1935, and so on through 2005.  
By choosing the brands most likely to be attractive to unauthorized users—indeed, our white 
pages data suggested that CADILLAC and HARVARD were very attractive—and by taking 
regular yearly snapshots from the 1920s to the present, we expected to discover multiple 
unauthorized uses.  Despite evaluating seventeen years worth of advertising, we found almost no 
uses at all, prompting us to abandon any further searching of display ads. 
                                                 
50 See PROQUEST, http://www.proquest.com/en-US/catalogs/databases/detail/pq-hist-news.shtml (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2011) for information regarding the newspapers available in this database. 
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 In 1965, we found an ad for a movie, “The Yellow Rolls Royce,” in the Washington 
Post,51 and an ad for another movie, “Breakfast at Tiffany’s,” in the New York Times.52  Also in 
the 1965 Times, we found an ad for “The Cadillac Garden Apartments.”53   In an issue of the 
1985 Times, we found an ad for “Steinway Computing.”54  We found two unauthorized uses of 
Harvard:  A 1975 ad in the New York Times for “The Harvard Agency,”55 and a 1995 ad in the 
Times for “Harvard Graphics.”56  This was the sum total of unauthorized uses found after 
searching through seventeen years of ads in three major newspapers for some of the most 
desirable marks in American brand history.  With the possible exception of the two movies, the 
uses are not even for products, but are rather uses as business names/service marks. 
 
2.  Federal Trademark Registrations.  Once a dilution statute is passed, an unauthorized 
user of a mark protected by that statute has little incentive to try and register its trademark.  After 
all, registration might bring the unauthorized use to the attention of the trademark owner or 
render a previously tolerable unauthorized use more threatening.  Nonetheless, before the 
passage of anti-dilution statutes, non-confusing, unauthorized uses of famous marks were 
permissible, and no legal impediments to registration existed.  Registration records, therefore, 
provide some evidence of unauthorized uses on marketed products.  At the federal level, dilution 
was not a bar to registration until 1996, so we searched the Federal Register for evidence of 
unauthorized uses prior to 1996, with an eye toward discovering uses as product names.  With 
                                                 
51 See WALL STREET J., May 20, 1965, p. 12. 
52 See N.Y TIMES, December 15, 1965, p. 52. 
53 See N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1965, p. R44. 
54 See N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1984, p. C8. 
55 See N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1974, p. 75. 
56 See N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1995, p. WLI1. 
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the exception of HARVARD and CADILLAC, we found little evidence of the unauthorized use 
of famous marks as product names. 
 For the 31 marks in our study other than CADILLAC and HARVARD, we examined 
2122 registration records57 over the period 1898-1996 and found 15 registrations58 that appeared 
to be unauthorized.  Twelve of those registrations were for products as opposed to services.59  In 
addition, we found three post-1996 records, one of which was an unauthorized registration for a 
product.60  Even the most attractive luxury marks, like BULOVA, ROLLS-ROYCE, 
MERCEDES-BENZ, ROLEX, PERRIER, and STEINWAY attracted no unauthorized registrants 
over a hundred-year period.  This is far from proof that no one was making unauthorized use of 
famous marks on products, but it is consistent with the lack of users found in the newspaper data. 
 As with the white pages data on business names, CADILLAC and HARVARD stand out 
in the registration records as attractive targets for unauthorized users.  Of 229 total records for 
CADILLAC, we found 79 unauthorized registrations, 56 before 1996 and 23 after 1996.  Of the 
pre-1996 unauthorized registrations, 45 were for products as opposed to services, and of the post-
1996 registrations, 15 were for products as opposed to services.  Of 247 total records for 
HARVARD, we found 72 unauthorized registrations, 61 before 1996 and 11 after 1996.  Of the 
pre-1996 unauthorized registrations, 50 were for products as opposed to services, and of the post-
1996 registrations, 6 were for products as opposed to services. 
                                                 
57 The 2122 figure includes some recorded applications that were abandoned.  Since reasons for 
abandonment are not provided on the record, we did not consider an abandoned application as evidence of 
use in the market.  One of the most frequent reasons for abandonment is lack of use.  We found forty-five 
abandoned applications that appeared to be filed by non-owners of the famous mark. 
58 Since we were looking for evidence of market behavior, we counted all registrations regardless of 
current status, e.g. whether they were listed as “alive” or “dead” due to cancellation or failure to renew. 
59 Those uses included Green Giant for saw blades, Corvette for compasses, Zippo-Spat for majorette 
costumes, Windex for sailboat weather vanes, Jack Daniels for shoes, and Panel Chanel (probably a 
misspelling of “channel”) for “molded wiring ducts.” 
60 This registration was Green Giant for “automotive cleaning preparations.” 
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 3.  State Trademark Registrations.  Another potential source of evidence of uses of 
famous marks as product names is state trademark registration databases.  Many times businesses 
contemplating purely local use will register only with a state trademark office.  State 
registrations are much cheaper and easier to obtain, because state offices typically do not 
examine applications. Unfortunately, the ST-TM database on Westlaw, which tracks state 
trademark registrations, is not nearly as comprehensive as the database of the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office.  In fact, many states do not include records before 1986.61  Generally, 
coverage seems to be spotty before 1990, although in some states the records go back more than 
eighty years.  Apart from sporadic registration of unauthorized uses of CADILLAC and 
HARVARD, we found no evidence in the ST-TM database of any significant unauthorized uses 
of the thirty-three famous marks on our list, either as business names or product names. 
 After searching for non-Harvard and non-Cadillac registrations in all fifty states for the 
entire time period before the 1996 federal anti-dilution statute, we found 4 service marks62 and 5 
product names63 that appeared to be unauthorized uses.  Seven of the state registrations occurred 
in the absence of state anti-dilution protection; two occurred in states at times when a dilution 
statute was in effect.  During the same pre-1996 period, we found 31 unauthorized registrations 
of CADILLAC and 9 for HARVARD.  After the passage of the 1996 federal law, and again 
                                                 
61The summary page of the Westlaw database TRADEMARKSCAN(R)-U.S.-STATE lists the dates of 
coverage for all states. WESTLAW, http://web2.westlaw.com/scope/default.aspx?db=ST%2DTM&RP= 
/scope/default.wl&RS=WLW10.01&VR=2.0&SV=Split&FN=_top&MT=208&MST= (last visited Jan. 
30, 2011). 
62 For example, a 1976 registration of “Rolls Royce” for a Wisconsin Realty Company and a 1993 
Arkansas registration of “Oreo” for an educational services company were found. 
63 For example, two 1978 New Jersey registrations of “Chanel” for furniture and housewares and a 1980 
Illinois registration of “Rolex” for environmental control systems were found. 
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omitting CADILLAC and HARVARD, we found 6 more service marks64 and 1 more product 
name65 that appeared to be unauthorized uses.  During the same period, we found 11 
unauthorized registrations using CADILLAC and 8 using HARVARD.  Given that prior to 1996, 
only half of the states had enacted dilution statutes (and some of those quite recently before the 
federal law passed), we expected to find more unauthorized registrations of famous marks, 
despite the lack of a full historical record in the Westlaw database.   Due to the lack of a full 
record, we do not want to make too much of these findings, except to remark that they are 
consistent with the newspaper data and federal registration data in suggesting that the 
unauthorized use of famous marks as product names is a much less common phenomenon than 
the use of such marks as business names. 
 
4.  Trademarks in Reported Litigation.  Another potential source of evidence about 
unauthorized uses of trademarks as product names is the reported case law on dilution.  Again, it 
is helpful to look at the world before and after the passage of the 1996 federal law.   
a.  Litigation Under State Statutes.  The first thing we noticed was how little 
impact state anti-dilution statutes have had on litigation since the first law was enacted in 
Massachusetts in 1947.66  In the fifty years before the 1996 federal law, state dilution laws 
provided the sole basis of a finding in favor of only thirteen trademark owners,67 and three of 
                                                 
64 For example, a 2005 North Dakota registration of “Oreo” for animal rescue and a 1996 Arizona 
registration of “Green Giant” for landscaping services were found. 
65 A 2001 New Hampshire registration of “Bikeweiser” for t-shirts appeared to be unauthorized. 
66 See Act of May 2, 1947, ch. 307, § 7a, 1947 Mass. Acts 300 (providing text of first state anti-dilution 
statute) 
67 See Tri-County Funeral Home, Inc., 957 S.W.2d 694 (Ark. 1997) (finding “Eddie Howard Funeral 
Home” diluted “Howard Funeral Home); Deere & Co., v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(holding John Deere deer logo diluted by defendant’s animated deer in television commercial); 
McDonald’s Corp. v. Arche Techs., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1557 (N.D. Cal.  1990) (holding Golden arch logo for 
computer software and hardware diluted McDonald’s golden arches mark); Eastman Kodak Co. v. 
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those owners were challenging uses in exactly the same line of business, which presumably 
should have counted as infringing uses.68  State anti-dilution laws were pleaded and discussed in 
many more cases, almost always as secondary claims tacked on to causes of action based on the 
standard likelihood of confusion rationale.  It’s relatively easy to find cases where a court finds 
both dilution and confusion, in other words, cases where the dilution statute is redundant.  Yet 
since the purpose, indeed the very raison d’etre, of dilution statutes is to provide for relief in the 
absence of confusion, we looked only for cases where the dilution statute provided the basis for 
decision in the absence of a finding of confusion. 
We recognize the limitations of analyzing market behavior by looking at decided cases; 
nonetheless, we think that thirteen is a small number, representing one reported victory 
approximately every five years for national trademark owners.  Even more interesting is that 
only two of the thirteen cases finding dilution involve the sale of an unauthorized product 
bearing a famous trademark, and both of those involve the appropriation of an image (the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Rakow, 739 F. Supp. 116 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding Kodak mark diluted by stage name of “vulgar” 
comedian); American Express Co. v. Vibra Approved Labs. Co., 10 U.S.P.Q. 2006 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 
(holding American Express card replica containing a condom violated dilution laws); Ringling Bros.-
Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet, Inc., 855 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(finding plaintiff’s slogan diluted by defendant’s use of “Greatest Used Car Show on Earth”); Hyatt Corp. 
v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 736 F.2d 1153 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding Hyatt Hotel mark diluted by use of “Hyatt 
Legal Services” without addition of “Joel Hyatt,” the owner’s name); Wedgewood Homes, Inc. v. Lund, 
659 P.2d 377 (Or. 1983) (“Wedgewood” service mark for home construction and design firm diluted by 
use of “Wedgewood” on retirement homes); Cmty. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. Orondorff, 678 F.2d 
1034 (11th Cir. 1982) (deciding that “Cookie Jar” for bank ATM service machine was diluted by use of 
the same name for nearby strip club); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124 (N.D. 
Ga. 1981) (holding parody of Pillsbury doughboy in Screw magazine dilutive); Instrumentalist Co. v. 
Marine Corps League, 509 F.Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (finding “John Phillip Sousa” for band award 
diluted by “John Phillip Sousa” for band award); Dawn v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 358 (C.D. 
Cal. 1971) (holding plaintiff’s use of “tower of babble” for board game to be diluted by aspirin 
manufacturers use of phrase in its print ads showing many different kinds of pain relievers); Great Scott 
Food Mkt., Inc. v. Sunderland Wonder, Inc., 203 N.E.2d 376 (Mass. 1965) (holding “Big G” for food 
store diluted by “Big G” for food store). 
68 Tri-County Funeral Home, Inc., 957 S.W.2d at 694 (holding “Eddie Howard Funeral Home” diluted 
“Howard Funeral Home); Instrumentalist Co., 509 F. Supp. at 323  (finding “John Phillip Sousa” for band 
award diluted by “John Phillip Sousa” for band award); Great Scott Food Mkt., Inc. 203 N.E.2d at 376 
(holding “Big G” for food store diluted by “Big G” for food store). 
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McDonald’s golden arches and the American Express card design) as opposed to a famous brand 
name.69  One can find a vulgar comedian using KODAK as a stage name,70 a car dealer claiming 
to be the “The Greatest Used Car Show on Earth,”71 or a legal services company using the name 
“Hyatt” without permission of the hotel chain,72 but there is nothing like BUICK ASPIRIN, 
BULOVA GOWNS, SCHLITZ VARNISH, or any reported appropriation of famous brand 
names for use on commercial products.73  Whatever inspired Congress to rely on BUICK 
ASPIRIN as its paradigmatic example of dilution, it was certainly not the holdings of reported 
litigation at the time it passed the FTDA.  The pre-1996 litigation therefore provides incremental 
support for the notion that unauthorized uses of trademarks are a much more frequent occurrence 
in trade names rather than trademarks. 
b.  Post-1996 Litigation.  Decisions relying solely on the FTDA and not also on 
confusion-based infringement have come at a faster rate than state law dilution decisions, 
fourteen cases in the first twelve years of the FTDA.74  Of those fourteen decisions, only three 
                                                 
69 McDonald’s Corp., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1557 (holding Golden arch logo for computer software and 
hardware diluted McDonald’s golden arches mark); American Express Co., 10 U.S.P.Q. at 2006 (deciding 
that American Express card replica containing a condom found to dilute). 
70 Eastman Kodak Co., 739 F. Supp. at 116 (finding Kodak mark diluted by stage name of “vulgar” 
comedian). 
71 Ringling Bros., 855 F.2d at 480 (holding plaintiff’s slogan diluted by defendant’s use of “Greatest Used 
Car Show on Earth”). 
72 Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 736 F.2d 1153 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding Hyatt Hotel mark diluted by 
use of “Hyatt Legal Services” without the addition of “Joel Hyatt,” the owner’s name). 
73 One could argue that Instrumentalist Co. v. Marine Corps League, 509 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill. 1981), 
which held that the name John Phillip Sousa” for band award diluted by “John Phillip Sousa” for band 
award, involves an award, which might be considered a product.  But since the award was not for 
commercial sale, it’s most fitting to characterize the case as involving a firm engaged in the service of 
bestowing band awards. 
74 See Bell v. Starbucks U.S. Brands Corp., 389 F. Supp. 2d 766 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (finding the name “Star 
Bock” beer diluted Starbucks Coffee under Texas state dilution statute); Kraft Food Holdings, Inc. v. 
Helm, 205 F. Supp. 2d 942 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (deciding that the name “King Velveeda” on web site diluted 
Kraft’s Velveeta mark for cheese under FTDA); McNeil Consumer Brands v. U.S. Dentek Corp., 116 F. 
Supp. 2d 604 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (holding “Tylenol mark” diluted by “Tempenol” on competing analgesic);  
Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sporting News, LLC, 212 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding 
“Sporting News” diluted by “Las Vegas Sporting News” a sports gambling publication); Sporty’s Farm, 
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involve the appropriation of a famous brand name on a product,75 and one involves the 
appropriation of a famous product shape.76  Once again, we see a disproportionate representation 
of unauthorized uses in trade names and service marks as opposed to product names.   
 
5.  A Final Glimpse at Unauthorized Uses as Product Names.  We had assumed that after 
searching national newspaper, state and federal trademark registers, and sixty-five years of 
litigation we would find as much evidence of unauthorized uses of famous marks on products as 
in trade names.  Apart from a few unauthorized registrations of CADILLAC and HARVARD on 
products, almost all of the thousands nearly 2000 unauthorized uses we found were trade names 
or service marks.  We attempt one final confirmation of this phenomenon. 
The Thomas Register of American Manufactures was the bible for information about 
manufacturers, distributors and their products for over a hundred years, at one time issuing as a 
                                                                                                                                                             
LLC v. Sportsman’s Market, Inc., 202 F.3d 489 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that the lower court found that 
Sportsman’s Market magazine was diluted by www.sportys.com web site); Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, 
Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (1999) (holding that “Catdog” crackers diluted Goldfish crackers); Archdiocese of St. 
Louis v. Internet Entm’t Grp., Inc., 1999 WL 66022 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (finding www.papalvisit.com web 
site to be diluting of Roman Catholic trademarks); Panavision Int’l LP v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th 
Cir. 1998) (Panavision mark diluted by www.panavision.com); Polo Ralph Lauren LP v. Shuman, 46 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1046 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (holding Polo mark for shirts diluted by “Polo Club” for adult 
entertainment services); Mattel, Inc. v. JCom, Inc., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1467 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that 
“Barbie’s Playhouse” for adult entertainment diluted Mattel’s famous mark); Intermatic v. Toeppen, 947 
F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (finding Intermatic mark was dilulted by www.intermatic.com); Anheuser-
Busch, Inc. v. Andy’s Sportswear, Inc, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1542 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (finding a “Buttweiser” t-
shirt dilutive); Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entm’t Grp., Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1479 (W.D. Wash. 1996) 
(finding Candyland board game diluted by www.candyland.com for adult entertainment); Toys “R” Us, 
Inc. v. Akkaoui, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1836 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding toy store mark diluted by “Adults ‘R’ Us” 
used on internet site and shopping service). 
75 See Bell, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 766 (finding that “Star Bock” beer diluted Starbucks Coffee under Texas 
state dilution statute); McNeil Consumer Brands, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 604 (finding “Tylenol mark” diluted 
by “Tempenol” on competing analgesic); and Times Mirror Magazines, Inc.  212 F.3d at 157 (holding 
that “Sporting News” diluted by “Las Vegas Sporting News” a sports gambling publication). 
76 See Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 208 (finding that “Catdog” crackers diluted Nabisco brand goldfish 
crackers). 
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thirty-four volume yearly opus.77  Currently available only online and rebranded as ThomasNet, 
it still provides product information, including brand names in over 67,000 product categories 
(the overall number of brand names is unclear from the web site).78  Unfortunately it is not 
possible to do historical searches on the web site, and it is very difficult to identify which brand 
names listed on the site are applied to products without the authorization of the owner.  A search 
for CLOROX, for example, in the ThomasNet brand name search engine returns thirty-six hits, 
mostly from distributors of cleaning products.  If some of the CLOROX products returned in the 
search are unauthorized, it is not evident on the face of the data.  A brief search under 
CADILLAC and HARVARD nonetheless illuminates the disparity we have seen between 
unauthorized uses of famous trademarks on products as opposed to business names.  A search for 
CADILLAC on ThomasNet returns just four hits, two of which might be unauthorized, and a 
search for HARVARD returns nine hits, all of which might be unauthorized.79  Compare these 
results to a search in the Hoovers database,80 which allows for global searches for 32 million 
company names in the U.S.81  A search under CADILLAC returns over 200 businesses that 
appear to be using the mark without authorization, and a search for HARVARD returns 
approximately 400 unauthorized business names.  We note that the Hoovers results are quite firm 
because of the detailed information the search engine provides about each business and the 
ability to see branches of related companies.  Unfortunately, neither database is historical, so we 
                                                 
77 See Company History, THOMASNET, http://www.thomasnet.com/companyhistory/ThomasRegister 
_today.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2011) (providing history of the database). 
78 THOMASNET, http://www.thomasnet.com/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2011). 
79 We assume, for example, that HARVARD products sold by Dakota Fluid Power, Inc. or Master Sales 
& Service, Inc., a distributor of coolant recovery systems, indicate the existence of an industrial liquid 
product sold under the HARVARD mark without the authorization of Harvard University. 
80 HOOVERS, www.hoovers.com (last visited Jan. 30, 2011) provides the company website. 
81 See HOOVERS, http://www.hoovers.com/companies/100003475-1.html for access to the database. 
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cannot chart any trends over time, but this brief snapshot is consistent with our suggestion that 
BUICK ASPIRIN is not a problem, but BUICK REALTY might be. 
 
C.  WHY ARE PRODUCT NAMES DIFFERENT THAN TRADE NAMES?  WHAT ABOUT CADILLAC AND 
HARVARD? 
 
The combination of data gleaned from historical business white pages, state corporate 
and LLC records, three national newspapers, state and federal trademark registrations, and all 
reported litigated cases paints a partial picture of the market for unauthorized uses of famous 
trademarks.  Quite frankly, we initially did not expect to find so much evidence of unauthorized 
uses, assuming that a blatant misappropriation of a famous mark was a bad business decision 
likely to annoy and alienate consumers.  Although unauthorized usage was far from rampant, 
even when it was legal, we cannot say that the amount of activity we found was insignificant, 
even when the numerous uses of CADILLAC and HARVARD are discounted.  Thus 
unauthorized uses, at least as business names, were not a figment of the Congressional 
imagination; however, two puzzles remain. 
First, why are the vast majority of unauthorized uses found on trade names and not 
product names?  BUICK ASPIRIN and its ilk seem not to be a problem.  The answer may be 
related to our consumer alienation hypothesis.  Consider ROLLS ROYCE REALTY, which 
registered its service mark in Wisconsin in 1976.  It was likely a local business, and the 
community where it was situated probably understood the choice of name as self-laudatory, but 
not overtly unethical.  It appears to be making a claim of high quality service which can be 
verified face-to-face with the agency.  One can easily imagine a customer making a light-hearted 
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joke about the name to an agency representative.  Now, consider a hypothetical product like 
ROLLS ROYCE CANDY.  Most sellers of products aim at nationwide distribution, and most 
products are consumed at a distance from their producers.  Appropriating a famous name that is 
obviously unauthorized may be more risky in this context.  It smacks of unethical behavior or of 
an attempt to mislead, and it may be perceived as risky to buy a product from a company that 
blatantly engages in a cheap attempt to influence purchases.  What sorts of decisions are being 
made by this company in its candy plant, a place the customers will never encounter?  In other 
words, the appropriation of a famous mark is a type of representation that may be more easily 
verified in the context of local services than with far-flung consumer goods.  And it may be the 
sort of claim that is less alienating when made by a neighbor instead of a stranger.  Applying 
ROLLS-ROYCE to a local real estate agency may be a better business decision than applying it 
to a candy bar. 
Second, what’s so special about CADILLAC and HARVARD?  The CHANEL, ROLLS-
ROYCE, and ROLEX brands, for example, would seem to have just as much luster, but they are 
almost never appropriated.  One answer might be that CADILLAC and HARVARD are the true 
poster children for dilution theory, overused before our study started and continually overused 
ever since.82  In other words, dilution statutes arrived in time to save CHANEL, ROLLS-
ROYCE and ROLEX, but not CADILLAC and HARVARD.  In fact, our first study showed a 
positive correlation between the number of unauthorized uses at the beginning of the study and 
                                                 
82 Cadillac was founded in 1902. See History and Heritage, CADILLAC, http://www.cadillac.com 
/experience/history/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2011) (providing complete history of Cadillac product).  Harvard 
was founded in 1636. See  Harvard at a Glance, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, http://www.harvard.edu 
/about/glance.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2011) (providing answers to popular questions regarding the 
university).  Although Rolls Royce was founded in England in 1906, it did not enjoy substantial 
popularity in the US until later in the 1910s.  Rolex watches did not have substantial sales in the US until 
the 1940s, and Chanel gained popularity in the 1930s.  See ENCYCLOPDIA OF CONSUMER BRANDS 
at ___. 
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the percentage decline by the end.  Those marks that had fewer unauthorized uses at the 
beginning of the study exhibited greater rates of decline.  We note in Part III below that despite 
all of the unauthorized uses, CADILLAC and HARVARD (and other frequently used famous 
marks) still admirably perform their original functions, calling to mind respectively a line of cars 
made by General Motors and a prestigious Ivy League university.  CADILLAC and HARVARD 
do indeed behave differently than other marks in our sample, but probably not because they are 
“diluted” in the sense that they have lost their ability to serve as effective source identifiers. 
Significantly, the words Cadillac and Harvard do more work in our culture than merely to 
identify a line of cars and a university.  They both communicate associations with a uniquely 
American prosperity and influence, high quality, and maybe even a “wow” factor.  In other 
words,  one might say that CADILLAC has acquired two meanings:  1)  a line of cars made by 
General Motors (n.), and  2)  luxurious (adj.); and that HARVARD has similarly acquired two 
meanings:  1)  an institution of higher learning in Cambridge, Massachusetts (n.), and 2) of 
highest quality (adj.).83   Unauthorized users are not necessarily attempting to attract those who 
love Cadillac cars or admire Harvard University.  The motivation of the user and the effect of the 
use may be the same as choosing “Acme,” “Pinnacle,” or “Superior.”  If the second meaning is 
primarily perceived by consumers in a non-automotive context, then the first meaning may not 
be diluted.  After all, depending on the context, we perceive the word “fluke” to mean a nasty 
parasitic worm or a stroke of luck.  The use of a word in one sense is not typically assumed to 
dilute the meaning of the word in its other sense.  In other words, the use of the word Cadillac in 
                                                 
83 On the meanings of “Cadillac,” see Ben Zimmer, Cadillac Thrives as a Figure of Speech, NY TIMES, 
Nov. 5, 2009, available at:  http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/08/magazine/08FOB-onlanguage-t.html.  
Zimmer argues that the meaning of “Cadillac” as “luxury” or “high quality” has become sufficiently 
independent of its use as a brand name that it has survived the decline of the brand.  On the independence 
of metaphorical uses of brand names more generally, see Laura Heymann, The Grammar of Trademarks, 
14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1313,  1335-1337 (2010). 
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“Cadillac Café” may not even be perceived as a use of the GM trademark.  And even if a use 
plausibly makes reference to the primary association, the very positive associations inherent in 
the second definitions of CADILLAC and HARVARD may actually enhance the distinctiveness 
of the mark.  Query whether the constant reference to “Cadillac Health Care Plans”84 hurts GM? 
 
D.  CONCLUSION:  NO EVIDENCE OF DILUTION 
 
We have other reasons for doubting that the unauthorized uses we have found are 
diluting.  As the President of the International Trademark Association noted during her 
congressional testimony, sporadic local (low “visibility”) uses of a famous national mark may be 
unlikely to have any effect on its distinctiveness.85  A handful of Rolls Royce shoe repair shops 
scattered across small town America simply do not pose much of a threat to consumer cognition 
of the mark throughout the country.  Therefore, our failure to find significant unauthorized uses 
of famous trademarks on products, as opposed to on businesses, suggests that dilution as a 
market phenomenon was not a problem before the passage of the FTDA.  Over a thirty year 
period, we found over 1100 unauthorized registrations of famous trademarks in state 
corporate/LLC databases.  This number may sound like a lot, but almost all were for partnerships 
or local firms, and some undoubtedly never did business under their registered names or went out 
of business after a short period of time.  It is quite likely that these sorts of sporadic local uses 
                                                 
84 See, e.g., the web site of Kaiser, a prominent health care provider.  http://www.kaiserhealth 
news.org/Stories/2010/March/18/Cadillac-Tax-Explainer-Update.aspx (“news accounts have frequently 
described Cadillac coverage as plans catering to Wall Street titans”). 
85 See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005:  Hearing on H.R. 683 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109 Cong. (2005) (statement of 
Anne Gundelfinger, President of the International Trademark Association) (“[W]here other similar marks 
are already wide use and have been over a lengthy period of time, it may be less likely that the junior use 
will have the effect of blurring the famous mark, unless those uses have little or no visibility to the 
average consumer.”). 
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pose no threat to famous national marks.  We admit that nationally marketed products bearing 
famous marks would constitute a graver danger, but we found little or no evidence of such 
uses.86
We do not assert, however, that Congress did not intend to create a cause of action in 
favor of trademark owners against single local unauthorized users.  The courts have consistently 
held that the statute applies against sporadic local uses,87 but our point is more subtle.  Congress 
wrote a statute to respond to two hypothetical phenomena.  First, it clearly imagined 
unauthorized uses of famous trademarks on products like BUICK ASPIRIN.  This concern seems 
to be a mere figment of the congressional imagination.  Second, it was concerned that multiple 
local uses of the same mark would spread like an infection around the country, eventually 
diluting the evocative power of the mark.  With the exception of CADILLAC and HARVARD, 
we found no significant pattern of local uses of any of the marks studied.  And we have already 
suggested above that the non-source identifying functions of those two special marks—
indicating luxury and highest quality respectively—suggests that the pattern of usage we found 
may not have constituted the sort of damaging “infection” that concerned Congress.  Finally, in 
Part III we will consider whether other aspects of consumer cognition may insulate these two 
unique marks from harm. 
 
II.  ANTI-DILUTION LAW AND THE RATE OF UNAUTHORIZED USES 
 
                                                 
86 To the extent that we did find some “Cadillac” and “Harvard” products, we will explain in Part III why 
even those uses are unlikely to cause dilution. 
87 See, e.g., Bell v. Starbucks U.S. Brands Corp., 389 F. Supp. 2d 766 (S.D. Tex. 2005) ( holding “Star 
Bock” beer diluted Starbucks Coffee under Texas state dilution statute) 
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Assessing the effect of the 1996 FDTA is complicated and requires us to revisit our data 
on corporate and LLC naming trends.  We resist the temptation to make claims based on data 
found in litigation and trademark registration databases because the sample size is so small.  We 
can do no more than note that from 1946 to 1996, dilution was the deciding factor in only 
thirteen cases, while from 1996 to 2008 it was the deciding factor in fourteen cases.  We found 
fourty-nine unauthorized state registrations before 1996 and only twenty-six afterward, but we 
cannot adjust for changes in business activity due to state-to-state discontinuities in the ST-TM 
Westlaw database.88  From 1988-96, we found an average of 1.3 unauthorized federal trademark 
registrations per year and 2.8 per year from 1996-2009, but those figures make no adjustment for 
significant increases in federal registration rates during the latter time period.89  More promising, 
our corporate and LLC naming data consists of thousands more observations which can be 
charted in relation to the shifting size of the source databases. 
 
A.  CHANGES IN USE RATES AFTER 1996 
 
Figure 4, presented in Part II.A above, showed a significant decline in unauthorized 
registrations in California, Illinois, Michigan, New York and Ohio combined after the passage of 
the FTDA in 1995.90  We show below in Figure 5 a separate blended curve for Michigan and 
Ohio, two states that did not have any anti-dilution laws until the FTDA, and in Figure 6 a 
                                                 
88 See supra note 61and accompanying text. 
89 For example, 145,879 trademark registrations were issued to U.S. residents in 2009, while only 69,138 
were issued to U.S. residents in 1996.  In 1983, approximately 40,000 registrations were issued, with a 
little more than 20,000 in 1973.  See Finding Fiscal Year Patent and Trademark Statistics in the Annual 
Commissioner's Reports and Performance and Accountability Reports, UNITED STATES PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/ann_rpt_intermed.htm (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2011), and USPTO Annual Reports, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/index.jsp (last visited Jan. 29, 2011). 
90 Wisconsin was excluded for insufficient data. 
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blended curve for California, Illinois, and New York, which all had state anti-dilution statutes in 
place since the 1950s.  An examination of the data in this way shows how difficult it is to draw 
firm conclusions about the possible effect of the FTDA on user behavior. 
         FIGURE 5 
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How one interprets Figure 5 depends very much on whether one believes that an upcoming 
change in the law can affect behavior.  The law changed in 1996 and afterward there is no 
discernible decline, but unauthorized uses drop steeply in the several years before the change.  In 
1988 the U.S. Senate passed an anti-dilution bill that really put the issue on the map even though 
the House did not act upon it.91  And in 1992 a new model state trademark statute was 
promulgated that was patterned on the failed Senate bill four years earlier.92  Sophisticated 
trademark counsel may well have seen the writing on the wall and have begun in the early 1990s 
to counsel clients not to appropriate famous trademarks in their corporate/LLC registrations.  
                                                 
91 See Welkowitz, supra note 17, at 23. 
92 See id. at 15-16. 
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Whether the corporate attorneys actually hired by registrants could foresee the inevitability of the 
upcoming legal change is a different question. 
 Interestingly, one can see in Figure 6 a decline from 1995 onward in states that already 
had dilution statutes.  As in states without dilution statutes, the decline begins around 1992. 
                      FIGURE 6 
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As noted earlier, state trademark laws were not very enthusiastically enforced by judges, so the 
added layer of federal protection may have had a deterrent effect, even in states that theoretically 
already provided similar protection under local law.  However, we make no firm claims as to 
causation. 
 
B.  NON-LEGAL FACTORS AFFECTING RATES OF UNAUTHORIZED USE 
  
Because fifty percent of the 131 trademarks in our prior study consisted of family names, 
we had to struggle to isolate the effect of significant family migration patterns on patterns of 
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independent uses of famous marks like BAKER, CARTER, CAMPBELL, DOUGLASS, FORD, 
MACK, ROGERS, and VICTOR.  We were also aware that trends in naming businesses after the 
family names of the founders may have changed over time.  Fortunately, none of the 33 marks 
chosen for this study consist of unhyphenated common family names, so changes in residential 
housing or business naming patterns would seem to be irrelevant in explaining changes in use 
rates.  In addition, since our corporate/LLC data cover entire states, any prior distortions caused 
by choosing cities as the geographic units of analysis should be ameliorated.  
Of the non-legal causes for change in rates of unauthorized uses we considered in our 
earlier paper, only one seems to be relevant here:  the possibility that changes in brand popularity 
over time affect the attractiveness of appropriating the name.  Advocates of broad protection for 
trademarks assert that second comers are attracted to successful marks and wish to appropriate 
the luster of the marks in order to increase business.93  If this were true, then one would expect to 
                                                 
93 See, e.g., Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203 (1942). (“The 
protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the psychological function of symbols. If it is true 
that we live by symbols, it is no less true that we purchase goods by them. A trade-mark is a 
merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led to 
believe he wants. The owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by making every effort to 
impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the 
means employed, the aim is the same—to convey through the mark, in the minds of potential customers, 
the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears. Once this is attained, the trade-mark owner has 
something of value. If another poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the symbol he has created, the 
owner can obtain legal redress.”).   
The House report on proposed anti-dilution legislation states that the new cause of action would 
“recognize[ ] the substantial investment the owner has made in the mark and the commercial value and 
aura of the mark itself, protecting both from those who would appropriate the mark for their own gain.”  
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995).  See also Anne LaLonde, Don't I Know You From Somewhere? 
Protection in the United States of Foreign Trademarks That Are Well Known but Not Used There, 98 
TRADEMARK REP. 1379, 1416 (2008) (“Famous marks are particularly attractive to free riders . . . seeking 
to capitalize on the financial investment of the mark owner. Copying a famous mark, the Federal Circuit 
recognizes, gives free riders immediate recognition and substantially-reduced advertising costs.”); Blake 
R. Bertagna, Poaching Profits: An Examination of the Ability of a Trademark Owner to Recover an 
Infringer's Profits Under the Lanham Act as Amended in 1999, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 257, 292 
(2008) (“[I]t is “famous marks” that are the ideal target for cybersquatters and “free-riders” since “famous 
marks. . . are more likely to be remembered and associated in the public mind” and are thus more 
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see a correlation between the popularity of a brand and the number of subsequent independent 
users of the brand name.  In other words, CADILLAC, a more successful brand prior to the 
Japanese auto invasion, should have been a less attractive target for appropriation in the 2000s 
than the 1970s.94  One would expect to see a decline in independent uses over a time period that 
correlated with the brand’s decline in popularity. In fact, of the 53 total independent uses of 
CADILLAC charted in our telephone white pages study after 1950 (almost all in Manhattan), 21 
occurred in 1950, 26 in 1960, and only one occurred in 2005. 
In order to determine whether our 33 famous marks95 experienced a change in 
attractiveness/popularity, we tracked each mark in 1993, 1998, 2000, 2003, and 2005 in the New 
York Times.  We counted every time a brand name was mentioned as an approximate measure of 
the extent to which the brand was in the public consciousness in a particular year.  Prominence in 
major newspapers is obviously a very rough proxy for brand popularity, but we note that courts 
and brand owners have long counted “consumer impressions” as a measure of brand 
consciousness96 and even as a way to measure secondary meaning (mark strength) in trademark 
                                                                                                                                                             
attractive as targets for would-be copyists.”) (citing Recot Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 
2000)). 
94 Cadillac sales plummeted in the last twenty-five years.  As a percentage of the total U.S. car market, 
Cadillac sales constituted only 1.2% in 2008.  See WARD’S AUTOMOTIVE YEARBOOK 251 (2009).  
Percentage in prior years include: 2003 (1.3%), 1998 (2.2%), 1993 (2.4%), 1987 (3.7%), 1982 (4.3%), 
1977 (4.0%), and 1972 (3.1%).  See respectively id. at 242 (2004), 250 (1999), 204 (1994), 156 (1988), 70 
(1983), 70 (1983), and 71 (1983). 
95 Since we are borrowing data from our prior study, we have to include four additional marks in the 
charts we present below:  FATIMA, MAZDA, PACKARD and UNEEDA.  These marks were included in 
the earlier study because those brands had expired, and we wanted to include some brands that had died 
prior to 1996.  They appear so infrequently in our post-1993 data that their incidental inclusion does not 
effect our analysis. 
96 See Graeme Austin, Tolerating Confusion about Confusion:  Trademark Policy and Fair Use, 50 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 157, 167 (2008) (“[A]ccurate assessment of the strength of the mark in any dispute would be 
difficult without some reference to consumer impressions. Assessing the strength of a mark necessarily 
involves some kind of inquiry into how consumers respond to the messages about the trademark that its 
proprietor has conveyed, mostly through branding and promotion. Similarly, a firm achieves sufficient 
‘fame’ for the purposes of dilution doctrine when the trademark has sufficiently penetrated consumers' 
consciousness. Proxies are sometimes used in the course of this inquiry: courts might focus on how long 
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litigation.97  Advertising theory in general discounts the content of advertisements but takes very 
seriously the number of times consumers encounter a brand name in any context.98  In other 
words, the number of times a brand is mentioned in a national newspaper (“newspaper hits”) 
may provide fairly relevant information about brand/consumer associations and therefore the 
attractiveness of the brand to appropriators. 
We counted a large number of newspaper hits for the 33 marks, averaging well over 
10,000 per year.  In order to account for changes in the contents of the newspaper database—a 
problem because fewer pages scanned means less data and presumably fewer hits—we used the 
five most common words in the English language as a baseline for the years studied.  We tracked 
the words “the,” “of,” “a,” “in,” and “to” (together “most common words”) in the same way we 
tracked the 33 brand names.  If the newspaper database remained the same size, the number of 
hits for these words should not have varied much from year to year.  Therefore, any change we 
saw in the number of common words should have been the result of a change in the size of the 
database due to the variable size of the New York Times.  By comparing changes in the frequency 
of hits on the most common words with the frequency of hits on our brand names, we are able to 
provide an accurate picture of real changes in the mentioning of the brands.  In other words, we 
charted a real decline in brand names only if their rate of decline was greater than the rate of 
decline of the five most common words over the same period of time. 
Figure 7 below presents the number of brand name hits as a proportion of the number of 
five-most-common-word hits.  We list the real trend for our 33 marks as the line labeled, “strong 
                                                                                                                                                             
the mark has been used in a particular marketing sector, or how many promotion and advertising dollars 
have been spent on it.”) 
97 See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15:50 (4th 
ed. 2010). 
98 See EDMUND KITCH & HARVEY PERLMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND UNFAIR COMPETITION (5th 
ed. 1998). 
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brand.”  We also chart hits on four of the most common brand names from our prior list of 131 
marks.  The line labeled “common brand” charts the frequency with which the words Diamond, 
Eagle, Metropolitan, and Royal are mentioned in relation to the five most common English 
words.  Since those four marks were representative of those omitted, we were curious to see if 
they (“weak brands”) behaved any differently than the more exclusively controlled 33 famous 
brands (“strong brands”). 
FIGURE 7 
Brand Names in Proportion to the Five Most Common Words (Unadjusted) 
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The graph seems to show a decline from 1995 to 2005.  We began to wonder, however, 
whether the data told a reliable story about brand popularity because the initial data used above 
included mentions of the brand names in classified advertising.  We decided that we should rerun 
the numbers without the classified ads hits for several reasons.  First, many of our most 
frequently mentioned brands were goods that could be resold,99 and a very high percentage of 
yearly “hits,” sometimes as much as 50%, came from ads in the classified sections of the 
                                                 
99 These include Buick, Bulova, Cadillac, IBM, Kodak, Mazda, Mercedes-Benz, Packard, Rolex, Rolls-
Royce, and Steinway. 
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newspaper.  When a brand is mentioned in the classified ads, it does not make an impression on a 
substantial number of consumers, as opposed to a large print ad or a story.  Second, an 
appearance in the classifieds may suggest a loss in brand luster.  For example, those seeking to 
sell their Cadillacs may be dissatisfied with them or looking to finance the purchase of a new 
Honda.  The appearance of some brands in the classifieds may also be a measure of hard 
economic times.  In some years, IBM and Steinway are mentioned frequently in the classifieds as 
sellers try to raise needed cash.  Third, and most importantly, after the mid-1990s the number of 
hits in classified ads plummeted to a tiny fraction of previous levels.  In 1998, for example, there 
were 287 classified ads for Buicks, but only twenty-four in 2005.  As people begin to sell goods 
online instead of in newspapers, the loss of ads generates an artificial down-tick in brand 
prominence if one includes classifieds in the hit count. 
If one omits classified ads from the adjusted hit count below, the downward trend is 
exaggerated somewhat: 
FIGURE 8 
Brand Names Mentioned Outside of Classifieds 
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We are hesitant to conclude, however, that variations in brand prominence (and therefore 
attractiveness for appropriation) is necessarily responsible for the significant decline we saw in 
unauthorized uses in the whites pages and the lesser decline we traced in the corporate/LLC 
name data.  Looking at only 1993-2005 may tell a misleading story.  If one traces back all the 
way to 1960, as we do below in Figure 9, the longer term trend is quite jagged and on an upward 
slope.   
FIGURE 9 
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Although there is a parallel decline in both newspaper hits and unauthorized uses from 1993 
onward, we hesitate to claim that those making naming decisions are so directly affected by 
brand prominence (as captured by our proxy).  It may just be coincidence.  After all, from 1960-
2010, our white pages data showed a significant decline in unauthorized uses, while Figure 9 
shows an overall increase in newspaper hits during the same period.  
 One could tell the following story, consistent with both the long term data on brand 
prominence (1960-2005) (trending up) and short-term data (1993-2005) (trending down).  
During the period 1960-2005, trademark protection generally increased and gave brand owners 
the confidence to advertise more extensively and promote their products to the public.  The 
proportional increase in brand name mentions during that time may be the result of investment 
spurred by an increasingly friendly legal environment for owners of famous marks.100  So, brand 
sharing as evidenced in the white pages decreased due to increased legal protection, and those 
same changes spurred the original owners of the famous marks to be more active in promotional 
                                                 
100 In our first paper we document the trend of increasing protection for trademarks over time.  See 
Brauneis & Heald, supra note 10, for information regarding that paper. 
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efforts, resulting in more newspaper mentions.  After 1995, the adoption of a federal dilution 
statute added slightly to the decline in unauthorized uses, with the slight decline in brand 
prominence coming from economic factors, brand aging, or a shift in advertising strategies away 
from print media.  In this story, the boost in legal protection from the FDTA does not stimulate 
investment in brand development, because the legal effect is overwhelmed by the factors just 
mentioned, or because it comes at the end of a long line of legal victories for trademark owners 
that diluted its influence.  At this point, however, we are only willing to conclude that the data on 
brand prominence is interesting, but inconclusive. 
 
III.  DILUTION, UNAUTHORIZED USES AND CONSUMER PSYCHOLOGY 
  
In this final section, we examine a phenomenon observed at several points in our 
research:  famous marks like CADILLAC and HARVARD seem to thrive despite significant 
numbers of unauthorized users.  We will first briefly survey some examples of marks that seem 
utterly resistant to the damage that is supposed to be caused by unauthorized sharing and then 
explore existing psychological research that suggests how consumers are able to 
compartmentalize brand information and retain and perceive multiple sets of messages 
simultaneously. 
 
A.  FAMOUS MARKS WITH HUNDREDS (OR THOUSANDS) OF CONCURRENT UNAUTHORIZED USERS 
  
In the introduction, we explained why our sample excluded many famous trademarks that 
were common surnames, place names or common words.  We excluded them not because we 
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wanted to game the numbers, but rather because we already knew what a formal search would 
reveal:  massive usage by unauthorized third parties.  We confirmed our intuition by checking 
many of the famous marks listed in the 1923 Hotchkiss study in the telephone yellow pages101 
and the Hoovers database102 of American businesses.  The telephone information is limited to 
California and New York, because the online database103 no longer lets one do a nationwide 
search, but the numbers still tell an interesting story. 
 Consider some famous marks that have maintained their prominence for long periods of 
time:  CAMPBELL’S for soup, IVORY for soap, SINGER for sewing machines, LIPTON for 
tea, MCDONALD’S for restaurant services, QUAKER for oats, PLANTERS for peanuts, and 
TIFFANY for lamps and jewelry.  It would be difficult to argue that these marks are no longer 
famous or are incapable of identifying a prominent product or service in the market, and yet they 
all survive in a world of massive unauthorized third-party use.  The California and New York 
yellow pages each reveal over 200 unauthorized businesses using Campbell or Campbell’s, while 
Hoovers lists over 400 American businesses operating under Campbell or Campbell’s.  The story 
is the same for the other marks mentioned:  Ivory (over 500 unauthorized businesses listed by 
Hoovers), Singer (over 1000 unauthorized businesses listed by Hoovers), Lipton (approximately 
200 unauthorized business listed by Hoovers), McDonald’s (over 400 unauthorized uses listed in 
the California yellow pages and 150 listed in New York), Quaker (over 700 unauthorized users 
listed in Hoovers), Planters (same), and Tiffany (over 1000 unauthorized users listed in 
Hoovers). 
                                                 
101 YP, http://www.yellowpages.com/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2011). 
102 See supra note 81 (providing access details to the Hoovers database). 
103 Here, we are referring to the YP (formerly known as Yellow Pages) website, which can be found supra 
note 101. 
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 Given the data presented in Parts I and II, the reader will not be surprised to find that 
Cadillac and Harvard behave similarly.  Hoovers reveals between 300-400 unauthorized 
businesses using the Harvard name and over 200 using Cadillac.  Not every data point represents 
a user trying to appropriate the glamour of the famous mark.  Some of the businesses operate in 
Cadillac, Michigan, or Harvard, Illinois, or have their locations on a Cadillac Avenue or Harvard 
Street, but the basic point still holds.  Despite the fact that consumers are surrounded by 
numerous unauthorized uses of famous marks, they still seem capable of making the initial 
market connection:  Campbell’s with soup, Cadillac with cars, and Harvard with education. 
 
B.  CONSUMER ABILITY TO COMPARTMENTALIZE DATA 
 
  
Our survey of the yellow pages and the Hoovers databases suggests that the market 
tolerates a high degree of brand sharing.  This tolerance may constitute anecdotal evidence that 
consumers have little trouble cabining data, that exposure to a use like BUICK ASPIRIN does 
not diminish the capacity of BUICK to identify the source of automobiles of a known quality.  
Some research by marketing professors, however, has suggested that unauthorized uses of 
trademarks might slow consumer recall of brand names and brand attributes without completely 
eviscerating the evocative power of the trademark.  Morrin and Jacoby exposed two small groups 
of business students to print advertisements featuring trademarks and also print advertisements of 
unrelated goods bearing the same trademarks.104  Under some conditions, they were able to show 
                                                 
104 See generally Maureen Morrin & Jacob Jacoby, Trademark Dilution:  Empirical Measures for an 
Elusive Concept, 19 J. PUB POL’Y & MARKETING 265 (2000) (providing study of recollection of brands 
and product attributes). 
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that recall of the brand was slowed (by less than a tenth of a second) and sometimes the ability to 
recall certain product attributes was marginally diminished.105
 The Morrin and Jacoby experiment, however, does not definitively answer the question 
we want to pose in this final section.  Our data suggests that only two of the famous marks 
studied were ever used on products or repeatedly used as local business names in the way that 
seemed to concern Congress as it passed the FTDA:  CADILLAC and HARVARD.  The Morrin 
and Jacoby experiment, however, provides a caveat that likely applies to both of the marks.  The 
most well-known brands they studied seemed resistant to dilution.  They admit that “[t]his study 
also shows that exceptionally familiar brands may be largely immune to some of the harmful 
effects of trademark dilution . . . very strong brands are immune to dilution because [consumer] 
memory connections are so strong that it is difficult for consumer to alter them or create new 
ones with the same brand name.”106  It seems likely to us that CADILLAC and HARVARD fall 
into this category of exceptional familiar brand that seem to be resistant to dilution.  They seem 
at least as strong as the “immune” brand reported by Morrin and Jacoby (CONTINENTAL).107
In addition, Rebecca Tushnet levels devastating criticism at Morrin and Jacoby’s 
conclusion that dilution of brand significance sometimes occurs in the consumer 
consciousness.108  She first notes that subjects in the Morrin and Jacoby study were not presented 
with trademarks in a live market context where consumers normally encounter categories of 
products.109  She argues that “even if the Heineken name in the abstract produces less association 
with beer in the abstract because of Heineken popcorn, consumers may still identify it as a beer if 
                                                 
105 See id. at 269. 
106 Id. at 274. 
107 Id. at 273. 
108 See Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in 60 Milliseconds:  Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. 
REV. 507, 527-46 (2008) (discussing “cognitive model of dilution”). 
109 See id. at 528 (noting how test subjects there were not presented the marks “in the real world”). 
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they are prompted with the category.”110  Markets are highly contextual, and Tushnet concludes 
that the classroom experiment of Morrin and Jacoby failed to capture the behavior of consumers 
in markets where it matters.111  We would add that Jacoby and Morrin created print ads for 
hypothetical products like HEINEKEN POPCORN, which our study shows to be highly 
counterfactual.  It would be far more likely for a consumer to encounter a HEINEKEN REALTY 
or HEINEKEN BARBER SHOP as a business name instead of a product name. 
Tushnet argues that the Morrin and Jacoby experiment does not show that a typical 
consumer walking down the street encountering a HEINEKEN REALTY sign will experience 
any difficulty in processing the HEINEKEN mark when viewed later in the supermarket or 
during a football game advertisement on the television.  Moreover, she identifies serious re-
affirmation effects unaccounted for in the Morrin and Jacoby study.112  Other studies she cites 
suggest that exposure to a mark like HEINEKEN REALTY may in some circumstances reaffirm 
the famous mark in consumers’ minds.113  She does not argue that this is always the case, but she 
finds fault with any theory of dilution based on an empirical assumption that new associations 
caused by unauthorized uses always have a negative effect. 
In addition, Tushnet examines a study by Joan Meyers-Levy that provides further support 
for our suspicion that even the multiple uses of a trademark like CADILLAC do not negatively 
affect human cognition.114  Several studies indicate that low frequency words (fifteen or fewer 
uses per million words) are easier to remember than high frequency words (one hundred or more 
                                                 
110 Id. at 530. 
111 Id. at 528 (discussing differences in conducting experiment in controlled test situation). 
112 See id. at 537-42 (“The delayed response times that Morrin and Jacoby saw as evidence of dilution 
when they tested subjects with a single recognition test could have improved the strength of the diluted 
marks in the long run.”). 
113 Id. at 541-42. 
114 Id. at 533-35 (dicussing Joan Meyers-Levy, The Influence of a Brand Name’s Association Set Size and 
Word Frequency on Brand Memory, 16 J. CONSUMER RES. 197, 202-03 (1989)). 
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uses per million words).115  Tushnet notes that only one of the top forty brands as rated by 
Interbrand is a high frequency word and suggests that “dilution does not harm many famous 
trademarks because adding associations to low frequency words does not interfere with retrieval 
or recognition.”116  CADILLAC is a low frequency word, with only five occurrences per million 
as measured in the Corpus of Contemporary American English.117  With the exception of 
HARVARD, all other marks we studied were low frequency words, with the majority of them 
(24/33) rating a frequency of one or fewer per million words.118  HARVARD, with a frequency 
of occurrence in American English of thirty-three per million words, is not a low frequency word 
under the Meyers-Levy measure, but it falls well short of the standard for a high frequency word 
(100 or more uses per million).  If Tushnet is correct that low frequency words are likely to be 
relatively immune from the associational disruption, then the unauthorized uses of the famous 
marks we study provide little or no evidence of dilution. 
Interestingly, the short list of trademarks we presented above that each exhibit hundreds 
of unauthorized uses in telephone yellow pages and Hoovers databases contains only one word 
that is not low frequency.  In terms of occurrences per million in the Corpus of Contemporary 
English, we found McDonald’s (.5), Campbell's (.3), Ivory (8), Singer (27), Lipton (.8), Quaker 
(2), Planters (2), Tiffany (6).  Even though the marks have multiple users in the marketplace, 
they are still, with the exception of Singer, relatively uncommon words.  This may explain why 
                                                 
115 See Meyers-Levy, supra note 114, at 200-05. 
116 See Tushnet, supra note 108 at 536. 
117 See Mark Davies, THE CORPUS OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN ENGLISH, http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/ 
(last visited Dec. 13, 2010) (providing database with public media documents containing over 410 million 
words). 
118 In terms of frequency per million words, we found Bacardi (.3), Bulova (.06), Cadillac (5), Clorox (.5), 
Dr. Pepper (.5), Guiness (.08), IBM (15), Kodak (4), Oreo (.4), Rolex (.9),  Sherwin-Williams (.04), 
Tampax (.08), Budweiser (1.3),  Coca-Cola (6), Ex-Lax (.08), Harley-Davidson (1), Jack Daniels (.4), 
Louisville Slugger (.2), Palmolive (.08), Sanka (.08), Steinway (.8), Windex (.2), Buick (4), Chanel (3), 
Corvette (2), Green Giant (.1), Harvard (33), Jell-O (1), Mercedes-Benz (2) [Mercedes (7.6)], Perrier (.6), 
Schlitz (.2), Rolls-Royce (1), and Zippo (.4). 
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they remain relatively easy to remember despite waves unauthorized users.  Even Singer, to our 
mind the weakest mark of the bunch, is not even close to qualifying as a high frequency word in 
the Corpus. 
IV.  A SUBSTANTIVE CONCLUSION 
  
In passing the FTDA in 1995, Congress proceeded under two important assumptions:  1)  
unauthorized uses of famous marks like BUICK ASPIRIN were a serious phenomenon in the 
marketplace, and 2)  unauthorized uses would negatively affect the associational qualities of the 
famous mark in consumers’ minds.  Congress had before it no empirical evidence to support 
either assumption.  Having now begun the research that should have been conducted before 
Congress ever voted, we conclude that neither assumption presently can be supported.  We 
studied 33 famous marks in state corporate name and LLC databases, the Westlaw state 
trademark registration database, the federal trademark register, advertisements in the New York 
Times, Washington Post, and the Wall Street Journal and all recorded dilution litigation under 
state and federal anti-dilution statutes from 1946.  Apart from occasional uses of CADILLAC 
and HARVARD, we could find no evidence that unauthorized uses of famous marks as product 
names were ever a problem.  We did find numerous examples of unauthorized uses of famous 
marks as local business names, but not enough to support the assertion in the House Report that 
such uses in the aggregate constituted a widespread “infection” that destroyed the 
communicative power of famous marks. 
 Even where we did find an unauthorized uses on products such as CADILLAC COFFEE 
or multiple instances of trade name usage such as THE CADILLAC LOUNGE, we found little in 
the academic literature on human cognition to suggest the distinctive quality of any mark was 
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likely to be diluted.  First, even the most respected advocates of dilution protection suggest that 
very famous marks are immune from disassociation.  Second, the most commonly appropriated 
marks in our study, CADILLAC and HARVARD, both have laudatory meanings in English (and 
also place name functions) apart from their use as source indicators that may insulate them from 
damage.  Finally, we could find no famous marks that were high frequency words in 
contemporary English, and research suggests that rare or relatively rare words have stronger 
levels of association and are more resistant to the dilutive affect of unauthorized uses. 
 Although we have shown that BUICK ASPIRIN, DUPONT SHOES, and KODAK 
PIANOS are a figment of the congressional imagination, we cannot claim to prove that dilution 
has never happened.  We merely sampled the field of famous marks; we did not study all of 
them.  Clearly more work needs to be done, but this paper, in conjunction with our prior work, 
finally starts the process of focusing legal analysis on actual market behavior instead of 
unsupported testimony by trademark owners. 
 Given our findings, one final question is worth asking:  If dilution is a myth, then why 
did trademark owners lobby so hard for protection from it?  One possibility is that trademark 
owners, like some individuals, adhere to an intuitive labor theory that rejects all sharing, even if 
the sharing is costless.  Creators of many sorts, not just trademark owners, often do not 
acknowledge the debts owed to predecessors who provided the raw materials for their creations 
and believe that justice demands they be awarded complete control.  Or perhaps the fight for 
dilution protection is not just a primitive intuition that “what’s mine is mine,” but rather a form 
of risk aversion.  Even our study cannot purport to prove that no mark has ever been diluted.  A 
highly risk averse trademark owner might see the cost of obtaining legislative protection to be 
lower than the fear of potential loss, no matter how remote.  In any event, attorneys eager to earn 
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fees from trademark owners are unlikely to discourage either uncharitable intuitions or extreme 
risk aversion. 
 More likely, the increasing prevalence of licensing and lifestyle marketing plays a role.  
There is money to be made from trademark uses in unrelated product areas, and dilution law may 
simply be rent seeking to capture all of that revenue.  GM has licensed the Cadillac brand name 
for products such as mobile phones119 and bicycles,120 and there is a company called Equity 
Management that manages brand licensing for GM and many others.121  It is possible that some 
trademark owners have overestimated the amount of money that can be made from lifestyle 
branding—Cadillac bicycles has not become a prominent brand, although the brand still exists122—
or maybe the total revenue from lifestyle branding does exceed the lobbying costs for the FTDA, 
and it is then a prudent rent seeking deal. 
 Finally, although we see no evidence that the dilution cause of action has proved to be an 
effective tool used by trademark owners to deter market entry,123 we wonder whether cease and 
desist letters are just a little more threatening when they contain a credible dilution claim.  Read 
broadly, and without reference to judicial resistance to their application, dilution statutes seem at 
first glance to provide powerful protection to trademark owners.  The recipient of a cease and 
desist letter, especially if uncounseled, might be overly-impressed by a dilution claim.  
                                                 
119 See  Quantum – Announces Major Licensing Deal with General Motors, BUSINESS WIRE, 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20081119005645/en/Quantum-%E2%80%93-Announces-
Major-Licensing-Deal-General (last visited Jan. 30, 2011) (“giv[ing] Quantum exclusive rights to produce 
custom handsets under the Cadillac brand name”). 
120 See CNNMONEY.COM, http://money.cnn.com/2005/07/26/Autos/cadillac_bikes/ (last visited Jan. 30, 
2011) (writing about new Cadillac bicycle brand). 
121 See Brands We Represent, EQUITY MANAGEMENT INC., http://www.equitymanagementinc. 
com/brands-we-represent (last visited Jan. 30, 2010). 
122 See CADILLAC BICYCLES, http://www.cadillacbicycles.com/us_index.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2010). 
123 Ken Port, for example argues that recent trends in trademark litigation constitute “trademark 
extortion.”  See Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion:  The End of Trademark Law, 65 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 585, 585 (2008) (arguing dilution statutes provide the means for effective strike suits by owners 
against new market entrants).  At least one of us doubts this claim.  See Robert Brauneis, Academic 
Perspectives on Trademark Dilution:  A Selected Survey with Commentary (on file with author). 
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Trademark owners might believe—rightly or wrongly—that getting one more bow in the quiver 
is worth the cost of lobbying and the chance that they themselves might become the object of a 
dilution claim some day.  Even where a dilution claim overlaps a traditional confusion-based 
claim, the dilution claim might look easier to plead and prove to an unauthorized user.  None of 
our speculation, however, suggests that trademark owners are truly victims of the “infection” of 
dilution referred to in the House report.  At best, we suspect that the FTDA represents another in 
line of special interest intellectual property laws without an adequate empirical basis.124
                                                 
124 See generally Paul J. Heald, American Corporate Copyright:  A Brilliant Uncoordinated Plan, 12 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 489 (2005) (criticizing the Sono Bono Copyright Term extension act and the Digital 
Millenium Copyright Act as examples of counter-productive private rent-seeking). 
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